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ABSTRACT 
Pretrial diversion programs have the potential to prevent future criminal 
behavior through intervention and community based services. This may be 
particularly true for specific populations of offenders such as those with mental 
illness, substance abuse disorder, and those with co-occuring disorders. Pretrial 
diversion programs take low-level offenders out of the jail population, both 
reducing system overpopulation and costs of incarceration. The programs also 
provide speedy case processing for minor crimes resulting in savings to the 
court system and personnel. Pretrial diversion can help an offender avoid a 
criminal conviction and potentially avoid future criminal violations. Results 
indicate that most Anchorage pretrial defendants comply with and complete 
the pretrial conditions in a very short time period, an additional savings in case 
processing time. This research details the initial assessment of the Anchorage 
Municipal Prosecutor Pretrial Diversion program. This assessment examines 
system savings in time and money, as well as policy implications for the justice 
system that may assist other jurisdictions as they consider implementing a 
pretrial diversion program. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is in severe financial distress, and figuring out how to 
effectively and efficiently administer the justice system with less funding 
presents a myriad of difficult decisions. Shrinking oil production on 
Alaska’s North Slope, combined with plummeting oil prices, have made 
for “a state budget crater of crisis proportions.”1 This practicum 
highlights the results of a recent assessment of the Municipality of 
Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program as an example of a small but 
hopeful cost-savings option for Alaskan communities. Financial crises 
oust us from comfort zones, force careful examination and prioritization, 
and necessitate adaptation. One change worth careful consideration is 
increased use of pretrial diversion alternatives. This practicum details the 
results of a recent effort to assess Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program 
and its potential for resource savings. Anchorage’s program is modest, in 
that it only addresses a handful of non-violent violations and does not 
take on the laudable goals of treatment of offenders or the restoration of 
specific victims. Yet as our findings indicate, the program is a wise fiscal 
strategy that spares valuable justice system resources and helps citizens 
avoid the collateral consequences of a conviction on one’s record. 
Funding Alaska’s justice system is a costly endeavor. Expenditures 
for the major justice agencies such as the Department of Corrections, 
Department of Public Safety, Department of Law, Alaska Court System, 
Public Defender Agency, and Office of Public Advocacy make up about 
9% of Alaska’s total state agency spending.2 As state revenues were 
plentiful from 2000–2010, Alaska’s justice system expenditures grew in 
lock step with growth in the total state operating budget.3 Part of the 
growing justice expenses resulted from more certain prosecution and 
increasingly punitive sentencing policies. This caused inmate populations 
to rise. The combined jail and prison population has grown 27% over the 
past decade, fueling increased corrections spending by 60% in twenty 
years.4 It is not just correctional costs that have risen. Between fiscal year 
 
 1.  Kirk Johnson, Alaska’s Schools Face Cuts at Every Level Over Oil Collapse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/us/oil-
collapse-drains-alaskas-wide-ranging-education-system.html?_r=0. 
 2.  Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, Justice System Operating 
Expenditures, 26(1) ALASKA JUST. F. 2, 2 (2009). 
 3.  See id. The total operating budget in FY 2000 was $3,513,383,100 and in FY 
2010 was $6,138,365,300. Id. 
 4.  Public Safety in Alaska, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2015/07/public-safety-in-alaska (last updated July 12, 2016). 
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(FY) 2000 and FY 2010, Alaska’s Department of Law and Public Defender 
Agency operating budgets more than doubled as well.5 
In 2014, the Alaska Legislature created a thirteen-member Alaska 
Criminal Justice Commission (ACJC) tasked with evaluating system 
practices and making recommendations to improve criminal laws and 
practices with an eye toward public safety, offender rehabilitation, victim 
restitution, and overall cost reduction.6 Because of the budget situation, 
cost reduction has occupied center stage in all relevant discussions. Once 
the ACJC assembled, it fashioned workgroups to review specific stages in 
the criminal process, and continues to engage in deep exploration and 
discussion about policies and practices in Alaska and their impacts on the 
above goals. Early in 2015, the ACJC saw the need and advisability of 
joining with PEW Charitable Trust’s Public Safety Performance Project. 
The State partnered with researchers from PEW and entered a justice 
reinvestment initiative wherein the State has agreed to follow the research 
findings by taking funds from less effective policies and programs and 
reinvesting those funds into more promising endeavors.7 In December 
2015, the ACJC provided a comprehensive set of policy recommendations 
to the Alaska Legislature.8 Major reforms that were proposed include 
using evidence-based pretrial practices, prioritizing prison and jail space 
for serious and violent offenders, strengthening community supervision 
programs, ensuring oversight and accountability, and expanding crime 
victims’ rights.9 Senate Bill 91 followed on the heels of the ACJC’s 
recommendations.10 This Bill seeks sweeping changes and incorporates 
many, but not all, of the ACJC’s recommendations. Governor Walker 
signed the Bill into law on July 11, 2016.11 
Alaska is not alone in its challenge to provide a workable justice 
system amidst shrinking budgets. Growing corrections populations, 
larger court dockets, and more former prisoners returning to their 
communities have forced numerous jurisdictions to become “laboratories 
 
 5.  See Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, supra note 2. 
 6.  ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaska-
criminal-justice-commission (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 7.  See ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT 1, 14 
(Dec. 2015), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/imported/acjc/ 
recommendations/ak_justice_reinvestment_intiative_report_to_acjc_12-9.pdf. 
 8.  See id. 
 9.  Id. at 14. 
 10.  See 29th Legislature (2015–2016): Full Text of SB 91, ALASKA STATE 
LEGISLATURE, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_fulltext.asp?session=29& 
bill=SB91 (last visited Jan. 26, 2017). 
 11.  Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Walker Signs Historic 
Criminal Justice Reform Bill (July 11, 2016), 
http://gov.alaska.gov/newsroom/2016/07/governor-walker-signs-historic-
criminal-justice-reform-bill/. 
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for innovative programs and collaborative problem-solving 
approaches.”12 Growing research shows these alternative approaches can 
reduce crime, promote better victim services, and increase public trust 
and faith in the justice system.13 And many of these approaches rely on 
the well-established concept of pretrial diversion.14 Pretrial diversion 
programs divert certain defendants away from traditional criminal justice 
proceedings into other case resolution alternatives such as community 
treatment programs. Most pretrial diversion programs are designed to 
address factors contributing to criminal behavior, provide a source of 
restitution to specific victims or the community, reduce costly 
prosecution and drains on court resources, and free defendants from the 
collateral effects of having convictions on their records.15 
In this practicum, we focus on pretrial diversion by providing some 
general characteristics of pretrial diversion programs in the United States, 
recounting the history and extremely limited use of pretrial diversion in 
Alaska, and then presenting the findings from a recent assessment of the 
Municipality of Anchorage’s pretrial diversion program. We conclude by 
highlighting the success of the program, discussing some limitations 
regarding the evaluation, and sharing some considerations for future 
development of pretrial diversion programs in Alaska. 
I. HISTORY OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION 
Pretrial diversion programs vary in name and structure but share 
several common characteristics. These programs often seek to modify 
behavior and include drug and alcohol treatment, psychological 
counseling, behavioral management sessions, vocational training, 
community service, and required restitution payments. Programs 
typically use established eligibility criteria based upon the offender’s 
characteristics and his or her perceived treatment needs (gleaned from 
assessment tools), as well as the type of crime committed. Diversion can 
occur at various stages in the life of a case, but as its name denotes, 
diversion occurs prior to conviction. Finally, prosecution is held in 
abeyance, and successfully completing the terms of the diversionary 
 
 12.  NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PROMISING PRACTICES IN 
PRETRIAL DIVERSION 4 (2010) [hereinafter NAPSA], 
https://netforumpro.com/public/temp/ClientImages/NAPSA/20b9d126-
60bd-421a-bcbf-1d12da015947.pdf; see also ALASKA CRIM. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra 
note 7, at 5. 
 13.  NAPSA, supra note 12, at 4. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. See also CATHERINE CAMILLETTI, PRETRIAL DIVERSION PROGRAMS: 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ 
PretrialDiversionResearchSummary.pdf. 
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program usually results in dismissal of the charges.16 Pretrial diversion is 
an attractive alternative because it provides powerful incentives to 
defendants, focuses on conditions driving criminal behavior, and diverts 
people out of an over-taxed case processing system. 
A. Pretrial Diversion in the United States 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
as of May 13, 2015, forty-four states statutorily provide some form of 
pretrial diversion alternatives.17 Thirty-seven states have programs 
created to address the needs of specific defendant populations, such as 
substance abuse or mental illness.18 These programs often utilize 
treatment or therapeutic court processes and programs that divert 
defendants away from court into community-based programs.19 Twenty-
six states have statutory authorization for general population diversion.20 
These programs address the general needs of all defendants and typically 
have some eligibility criteria, such as diverting only first-time offenders 
and misdemeanor offenses.21 
Pretrial diversion programs grew, particularly in the 1970s, and by 
March 1977, about 248 intervention/diversion type projects operated in 
thirty-seven states.22 States began passing laws to explicitly allow pretrial 
diversion programs, and several professional pretrial associations were 
organized, such as the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies 
(NAPSA) and the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI).23 As NAPSA created 
pretrial diversion standards, hundreds of programs sprung up across the 
country. It was during this decade that the National Advisory 
 
 16.  Amber Widgery, Pretrial Diversion, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 
13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-
diversion. Programs can offer diversion into other alternatives pre-plea or post-
plea. NAPSA, supra note 12, at 5–6. The National Association of Pretrial Services 
prefers the use of voluntary pre-plea programs to post-plea options. See id. at 5. In 
post-plea programs, pleas and convictions must be vacated rather than simply 
having the charges dismissed. Id. at 5–6. 
 17.  Widgery, supra note 16. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL PRETRIAL 
DIVERSION IN THE AGE OF SPECIALTY TREATMENT COURTS: EXPANDING THE RANGE OF 
PROBLEM-SOLVING OPTIONS AT THE PRETRIAL STAGE 5 (2007); Chris Cobb, Pretrial 
Intervention Project Begins in Anchorage, 2(6) ALASKA JUST. F. 2, 2–3 (1978), 
https://www.uaa.alaska.edu/academics/college-of-
health/departments/justice-center/alaska-justice-
forum/02/06jul1978/b_pretrial.cshtml. 
 23.  CLARK, supra note 22, at 5. 
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Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended 
pretrial diversion programs for all jurisdictions.24 
B. Pretrial Diversion in Alaska 
Alaska is one of only six states without a statute on pretrial 
diversion.25 While statutory authorization is not required to exercise the 
discretionary function of law enforcement and prosecution, clear 
codification helps cement a climate of alternative case processing, breaks 
through vacillating administrative ideologies about proper forms of 
punishment and accountability, and can establish uniformity across local 
jurisdictions. Despite a lack of statutory direction, Alaska has some 
experience with pretrial diversion at both the state and community level. 
i. The Statewide Pretrial Intervention Program 
 
The Alaska Department of Law first experimented with pretrial 
diversion in 1978 when it started the Pretrial Intervention Program in 
Anchorage.26 This pilot project targeted first-time property offenders with 
no history of violence and who were not dependent upon drugs or 
alcohol.27 The program focused on direct restitution to specific victims, 
community service, and compliance with a performance contract that 
offenders and other relevant parties developed.28 Both State of Alaska and 
Anchorage municipal prosecutors made referrals to this program. A 
favorable evaluation of the first year led the Alaska Legislature to fund a 
statewide pretrial intervention program in FY 1981, which extended by 
1983 to the communities of Barrow, Bethel, Fairbanks, Juneau, Kenai, 
Nome, Valdez, Ketchikan, Kodiak, Sitka, Dillingham, and Palmer.29 
As the statewide pretrial diversion program expanded, it sought to 
provide (1) viable alternatives to formal processing within defined 
guidelines, (2) rehabilitative services to defendants charged with non-
serious offenses, and (3) restitution either to the victim directly with 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Widgery, supra note 16. Technically, Alaska has a statutory diversion 
program for juvenile offenders called Youth Court, which allows dismissal of 
charges for applicable cases. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.400 (2016) (allowing 
diversion of juveniles alleged to have committed misdemeanors to local Youth 
Courts). 
 26.  See N.E. SCHAFER, ALASKA JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS UNIT, JUSTICE 
CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, EVALUATION OF THE ALASKA PRETRIAL 
INTERVENTION PROGRAM 12 (1988), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/ 
pretrial%20diversion/interprogram1988.pdf. 
 27.  Cobb, supra note 22. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  SCHAFER, supra note 26, at 13. 
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monetary reimbursement or to society generally through community 
service. To avoid net-widening, the program guidelines prevented non-
prosecutable cases from program referral, and the program had extensive 
evaluation capabilities built in from the beginning.30 And while intake 
guidelines permitted referral of felons and those with prior records, the 
program was primarily intended for those charged with non-serious first 
offenses.31 
Nancy Schafer, a University of Alaska Anchorage justice researcher, 
conducted a grant-funded evaluation of program outcomes from 1983 to 
1986. Schafer’s findings revealed a promising program and a unique 
opportunity to study diversion as it operates in different localities under 
uniform guidelines. Unlike site-specific programs that often vary in 
policy and practice, Alaska’s statewide program allowed both 
comparisons among different program sites operating under the same 
policies, as well as assessment of how prosecutors and program staff 
adapted the policies to meet local concerns. Such assessment is important 
to Alaska, which has communities that are distinctly different in size, 
accessibility, race, and ethnicity. For example, the statistics showed that 
Fairbanks made the greatest use of pretrial diversion, but used it 
predominately for underage drinking cases.32 
Schafer’s evaluation showed that the most common offense 
categories referred for pretrial diversion were theft, including theft in the 
second degree, theft in the third degree, and shoplifting offenses, drug 
offenses in the third and fourth degrees, burglary/trespass, assault, and 
 
 30.  Id. at 12. This so-called “net-widening” effect describes the situation when 
changes in justice system processes and procedures result in a more individuals 
controlled by the criminal justice system instead of less. Matthew C. Leone, Net-
Widening, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & PUNISHMENT 1087–88 (ed. David Levinson), 
http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/crimepunishment/n286.xml (last visited Mar. 
20, 2017). Some fear that diversion programs result in sanctions imposed on those 
(especially youth) who otherwise would never have experienced any formal or 
informal sanctions. Instead of reducing those under official supervision, a worry 
is that diversion alternatives increase those under supervision and subject to 
increased punishment for violations of the conditions of diversion. Christopher 
Bright, Lesson 5: Implementation Issues – Net-widening or Diversion?, CTR. FOR JUSTICE 
& RECONCILIATION, http://restorativejustice.org/restorative-justice/about-
restorative-justice/ 
tutorial-intro-to-restorative-justice/lesson-5-implementation-issues/diversion-
or-net-widening/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 31.  Id. at 26. However, it is clear that not just “easy” cases were “cherry-
picked,” because 36.8% of the participants were charged with felonies and 36.3% 
were not first-time offenders. See id. 
 32.  Id. at 31. 
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underage drinking.33 These accounted for 75% of all program referrals, 
with the majority being crimes against property or public order.34 
Some criminologists and justice officials worry that instead of a 
reduction of individuals entering the justice system, diversionary 
programs discriminate against minorities and lead to net-widening.35 
Schafer’s evaluation showed that the statewide program did neither. 
Referral decisions did not appear to be racially motivated or 
discriminatory. If anything, minorities like Alaska Natives were given the 
pretrial diversion option in excess of their percentage of the total 
population. Also, except for minor consuming alcohol cases, the program 
did not result in net-widening, as prosecutors ensured referrals were 
limited to “prosecutable” cases.36 Program guidelines allowed for referral 
of felony cases and defendants with prior records, but the program was 
primarily intended for non-serious first offenses. Schafer’s results showed 
36.8% of those in the program were charged as felons, suggesting the 
program did in fact serve as an alternative to more severe sanctions, 
rather than a new option for those who would otherwise have avoided 
sanction.37 Furthermore, 36.3% of participants had prior criminal 
histories.38 These numbers show that diversion was functioning as an 
alternative to more severe sanctions and minimized penetration into the 
criminal justice system39—the goals of pretrial diversion. 
Substance abuse treatment was required in about half of the referrals 
because most of the participants were under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs at the time of their offense.40 About 65% of program participants 
successfully completed their performance contracts, and the remainder 
was a mixture of partial completion or no participation.41 
Impact on future criminality (also known as recidivism) is 
important. Approximately one-third of the participants were rearrested 
 
 33.  Id. at 27–28. 
 34.  Id. at 28–29. 
 35.  CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIDENING THE NET IN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF PREVENTION AND EARLY INTERVENTION 1 (2001), 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/widening.pdf; OJJDP, Diversion 
Programs an Overview, Juvenile Justice Bulletin (Sept. 1999), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2017); 
Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of 
Outcomes Among Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, Race 
and Justice 3(3), 210, 223-27 (2013), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/ 
10.1177/2153368713483320 (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 36.  See id. at 29. 
 37.  Id. at 26. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 27. 
 40.  Id. at 33. 
 41.  Id. 
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for any offense between two years and four and one-half years after they 
were admitted into the program, mirroring the recidivism rates in other 
states’ pretrial diversion programs.42 This 33% rate was, and would 
continue to be, much lower than the criminal recidivism rate for all adult 
offenders in Alaska, which is about 65%.43 Schafer also found that age was 
the strongest predictor of rearrest.44 Offenders under age twenty-five 
were twice as likely to be rearrested as those over age thirty-five.45 Also, 
females in the program were rearrested at a rate about 10% less than 
males, and those without a high school diploma or its equivalent 
recidivated at a rate of about 40% compared to the 30% with a high school 
diploma.46 Race also seemed to be associated with rearrest: Alaska 
Natives and blacks were rearrested more often than whites, but Shafer 
believed this may have been more of a rural versus urban distinction than 
an indicator of discrimination.47 In Shafer’s sample, nearly 52% of the 
Alaska Natives lived in rural areas, whereas only about 21% of the whites 
lived in rural areas.48 
Despite the fact that the program was meeting its objectives, the 
statewide pretrial diversion program was “phased out” by the 
Department of Law in 1986 during Alaska’s last major oil recession.49 This 
is ironic because of the financial benefits of diversion programs.50 
Ultimately, 1,964 cases entered the pretrial intervention program before it 
was discontinued. Resource savings do not appear to have been a 
program goal, because it did not surface as a data point in evaluation 
tools. For example, Schaffer’s 1988 evaluation did not measure the extent 
 
 42.  Id. at 35. 
 43.  The recidivism in Alaska peaked in 2007 at 66%. Some believe the rate 
grew as the Murkowski administration sought to eliminate reformative programs 
offered by the Alaska Department of Corrections. The 2015 Alaska Recidivism 
Reduction Plan notes that recidivism dropped to 63.19% in FY 2011 as these 
programs started to return. THE ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 2015 RECIDIVISM 
REDUCTION PLAN: COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO SLOW PRISON POPULATION GROWTH 
AND REDUCE RECIDIVISM, at ii, http://www.correct.state.ak.us/commish/docs/ 
hb266.pdf. 
 44.  SCHAFER, supra note 26, at 37. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 39–40. 
 48.  Id. at 40. 
 49.  See id. at 14 (noting the Pretrial Intervention Program was ended in 1986 
because of a statewide economic depression). 
 50.  Kwixuan Maloof, The Recorder: Expand Diversion to Save Money and 
Lives, San Francisco Public Defender (Feb. 26, 2010); Mark S. Waller et al., Testing 
the Cost Savings of Judicial Diversion, Center for Court Innovation & NPC Research, 
45-49 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pretrial.org/download/diversion/Testing 
%20the%20Cost%20Savings%20of%20%20Judicial%20Diversion%20-
%20Center%20for%20Court%20Innovation%20et%20al%202013.pdf20of% (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
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to which cost savings to the State of Alaska were realized. We can only 
speculate on the degree, if any, that this statewide program saved judicial 
and prosecutorial resources. 
ii. The Municipality of Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program 
 
Anchorage reinstituted pretrial diversion alternatives in the mid-
1990s when it codified a pretrial diversion program in the Anchorage 
Municipal Code (AMC Section 08.05.060).51 It is a modest effort that refers 
fewer types of cases and offenders into the program than the earlier 
statewide program. Primarily, Anchorage seeks to divert first-time 
offenders in a specific range of minor offenses from traditional case 
processing. The Municipal Code states that pretrial diversion is available 
for any criminal or traffic offense except for those specifically identified. 
Diversion is not currently available for crimes against persons, weapon 
crimes, crimes harmful to minors, gambling, prostitution, and offenses 
related to driving under the influence.52 
Defendants are offered pretrial diversion independent of whether 
they are in custody or not.53 The Municipality operates three kinds of 
diversion: pre-charge, pretrial, and deferred sentencing.54 Under 
Anchorage Municipal Code Section 08.05.060, pretrial diversion 
agreements typically require the defendant to pay a fine or do community 
work service (CWS).55 Pretrial diversion participants are usually expected 
to complete their conditions within one month.56 Community work 
service is not usually an option offered for thefts over $100 since one hour 
of CWS equates to $6.25, and completion of the requisite number of hours 
would be hard to achieve within a month.57 The Municipality obtains 
fines from all three diversion programs.58 
  
 
 51.  Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060 (2016). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, SENTENCING AND ALTERNATIVES 
WORKGROUP PROPOSALS TO THE COMMISSION FOR RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING: 
PRETRIAL DIVERSION AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION 18 (Apr. 25, 2015), 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/proposals/ptd-dis4-15.pdf. 
 54.  Id. at 19. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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II. EVALUATION OF THE ANCHORAGE PRETRIAL 
DIVERSION PROGRAM 
Pretrial diversion programs have operated successfully at the 
federal, state, and local levels for years, so it is not surprising that early 
into the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission (ACJC) review process, the 
Sentencing Alternatives Workgroup began exploring the use of pretrial 
diversion programs as a cost-effective alternative to typical case 
processing for certain crimes.59 The Workgroup was intrigued by 
Anchorage’s program and invited Municipal prosecutor Seneca Theno to 
explain the program and discuss its impact. Some data was presented, 
mostly in the form of estimated numbers of program participants and 
total yearly amounts of collected fines, but hard numbers were 
unavailable as there was no ongoing organized data collection occurring 
and the program had never been evaluated.60 
The authors of this paper were invited to help provide specific data 
on the program, and worked with municipal prosecutors during the 
summer of 2015 to collect and assess initial information about the 
program. We embarked on a phased approach wherein phase one would 
track general information for three months to provide a “snapshot” of the 
program. Phase one’s snapshot provides information on the total number 
of people offered pretrial diversion, those who accepted and rejected the 
offer, those who successful completed their pretrial diversion obligations, 
demographic information about these groups, and the amount of time 
expended on each case collected to help predict resource savings. Phase 
two will take the findings of phase one and seek grant funding to provide 
a deeper review and follow program participants over time to determine 
the effects, if any, of successful participation. 
Data collection for phase one employed a convenience sampling 
methodology. That is, all offenders who were eligible for and were offered 
pretrial diversion during the data collection period were included in the 
sample. Program effectiveness for phase one considered whether: (1) the 
program is administered as designed (offers are made and carried out as 
set forth in the municipal code); (2) participants are successfully 
completing the program requirements and are diverted from the system; 
(3) bias or discrimination exists regarding who has access to the program; 
and (4) the program is a cost savings measure for the municipal and state 
government. Measures of cost-savings equated with financial success 
 
 59.  ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N WORKGROUP ON SENTENCING 
ALTERNATIVES, STAFF NOTES OF SNOWDEN CONFERENCE CENTER MEETING 1–2 (Dec. 
18, 2014), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/sites/default/files/meeting-
summaries/workgroup/sentencing-alternatives/12-18-14.pdf. 
 60.  See id. 
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consisted of revenue generated through fines collected by the program 
and the estimated timesaving for prosecutors and the court. These latter 
estimates were gleaned by comparing time spent on cases in the pretrial 
diversion program to estimates of time spent on comparable cases that do 
not go through the program. Time estimates from past prosecutorial 
experience were required since only two of the ninety-one closed cases in 
which offers of pretrial diversion were made declined participation. 
The municipal prosecutor’s office collected data on all defendants 
offered pretrial diversion from June to August 2015. It was estimated that 
the municipal prosecutor’s office offered pretrial diversion to an average 
of five defendants per day, for an estimated twenty-five offers per week. 
Based on the twelve weeks of data collection, we estimated that data on 
300 defendants would be collected. Data collection points included case 
characteristics (e.g., sanction, completion, outcome), dates for each point 
in the process of pretrial diversion, and participant demographics. As of 
August 31, 2015, the end of the data collection period, the actual sample 
size was 148 cases. Of these 148 cases, the outcome results include data on 
the ninety-one closed cases in the sample. 
A. Acceptance Rate and Offense Categories of Defendants Offered 
Pretrial Diversion 
Of the defendants offered pretrial diversion, 98%, or eighty-nine of 
the ninety-one closed cases, accepted the offer. Thus, it appears that 
pretrial diversion is very attractive to those charged with minor offenses. 
The four most common offenses, accounting for 93% of those defendants 
that accepted pretrial diversion, were driving without insurance (53%), 
theft over fifty dollars (24%), theft under fifty dollars (12%), and 
misconduct involving a controlled substance in the sixth degree (4%). 
Tables 1–3 outline the number of defendants with closed and open 
cases of pretrial diversion, the number of defendants that accepted 
pretrial diversion, and the categories of charges associated with the 
defendants whose pretrial diversion case was closed at the end of the data 
collection period. 
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STATUS PTD 
STATUS 
REASON TOTAL 
Closed   91 
 PTD Successful 82 
  No BW or continuances 61 
 PTD Complete But  
  BW involved after acceptance of PTD 5 
  BW involved after acceptance of PTD 
offer and additional continuances 
granted 
4 
  BW involved before acceptance of PTD 
offer 4 
  BW involved before acceptance of PTD 
offer and after accepting PTD 1 
  Continuances (1), no BW 5 
  Rejected initially by defendant but 
allowed into PTD later 2 
 PTD Unsuccessful  
  Allowed into PTD, but ultimately pled 
out to underlying charge 5 
 Rejected by Defendant  
  By way of BW at OCA or other reason, 
and not allowed to participate later 2 
 Dismissed for various reasons  
  Before PTD offer or acceptance 2 
Table 1a: Open Pretrial Diversion Case Counts. Legend: BW: Bench 
Warrant, OCA: Out of Custody Arraignment, PTD: Pretrial 
Diversion.  
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STATUS PTD 
STATUS 
REASON TOTAL 
Open    57 
 Accepted into PTD and now awaiting completion 13 
 Rejected by Defendant  
  By way of BW at OCA or other reason, and 
not allowed to participate later 
Prosecution ongoing 
6 
 BW  38 
  Bench Warrants and NEVER IN PTD. PTD 
would have been offered but defendants 
failed to show up for OCAs (For JW 
purposes, these cases are listed as PTD 
rejected, but they may be given PTD at next 
OCA if they show up to it)  
2 
 
 Bench Warrants and accepted into PTD, 
but then got subsequent BW (For JW 
purposes, these cases are listed as PTD 
accepted and PTD rejected at BW)  
17 
TOTAL OPEN AND CLOSED 148 
Table 1b: Open Pretrial Diversion Case Counts. Legend: BW: Bench 
Warrant, JW: Justice Ware Software used by Anchorage Municipal 
Prescutors Office, OCA: Out of Custody Arraignment, PTD: 
Pretrial Diversion. 
 
Tables 1a and 1b outline the status of all 148 cases. Further analyses 
on the measures of success were done on the ninety-one cases that were 
completed and closed by the end of the data collection period on August 
31, 2015. Table 1b additionally shows the status of the open cases at the 
end of the data collection period. The tables detail the range of significant 
events or reasons for the status of closed and open cases, such as a bench 
warrant being issued at some point during the defendant’s time in the 
pretrial diversion program. These reasons are listed as described by the 
prosecutor collecting the data for the evaluation. 
Analysis was done to concisely show the number defendants that 
were offered pretrial diversion and the number of defendants that 
accepted the offer. As already mentioned, in the ninety-one closed cases 
that data were collected on, a significant percentage of defendants, 98% 
(n=89), accepted the offer. While the number of defendants who accepted 
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pretrial diversion offers is not itself a measure of program success, it does 
indirectly suggest that the option is appealing. Still, multiple reasons may 
explain the high acceptance rate, and fully discerning these reasons 
would likely require participant interviews or surveys. One possibility is 
that defendants view the diversionary obligations as small and 
insignificant compared to what they perceive may be required if they are 
found guilty of their charged offense in court. Alternatively, the incentive 
of having the case dismissed and avoiding a conviction on their record 
may be the primary motivating factor. 
 
Offense Category/Charge 
Offense 
Category f % 
DWOI 48 52.7 
Theft Under 
$50 11 12.1 
Theft Over 
$50 22 24.2 
MICS 6 4 4.4 
CDM 1 1.1 
HAR 2 2.2 
D/wSDO 1 1.1 
DPU21 1 1.1 
Trespass 1 1.1 
Total 91 100.0 
Table 2: Offense Category and Charge 
 
Table 2 describes the offenses and charges of the sample of closed 
cases facing defendants who were offered pretrial diversion. Defendants 
who were offered pretrial diversion were charged with relatively minor 
offenses. This parallels the parameters of eligibility requirements of the 
pretrial diversion program for minor non-violent offenses. The vast 
majority of defendants, 93%, were charged with one of four modal crimes 
in ascending order: (1) driving without insurance (DWOI); (2) theft under 
fifty dollars; (3) theft over fifty dollars; and (4) misconduct involving a 
controlled substance in the sixth degree (i.e., Anchorage Municipal Code 
Section 9.28.303(A)) (MICS 6). The prosecutor’s office stated that in most 
cases the controlled substance indicated in this charge is marijuana. The 
remaining charges include: contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
(CDM), under Anchorage Municipal Code Section 8.50.050(A)(1); hit and 
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run leaving the scene of a crash (HAR), under Anchorage Municipal Code 
Section 9.10.020(C); driving a motor vehicle with a screen device 
operating (D/wSDO); purchase or delivery to persons under the age of 
twenty-one or access of persons under the age of twenty-one to licensed 
premises (DPU21), under Anchorage Municipal Code Section 
8.53.416.060; and trespass. 
B. Demographic Variations among Defendants Offered Pretrial 
Diversion 
Demographic variables were collected and analyzed on the ninety-
one defenders who accepted the offer of pretrial diversion and whose 
cases were closed by the end of the data collection period. There was no 
variation between the number of males (56%) and number of females 
(44%) that pretrial diversion was offered, and no variation between males 
(56%) and females (44%) that accepted the offer of pretrial diversion. In 
the two cases where defendants did not accept the pretrial diversion offer, 
one defendant was male and one was female. 
Pretrial diversion was offered and accepted by defendants who 
tended to be relatively young, with 85% between the ages of eighteen to 
forty years old. Defendants twenty-one to forty years old were the most 
common age group to whom pretrial diversion was offered and accepted, 
comprising 48% of offers and 49% of acceptances, followed by defendants 
aged eighteen to twenty years old with 37% of offers and 38% of 
acceptances. 
The racial composition of defendants offered pretrial diversion and 
those who accepted the offer was most commonly Caucasian (57% of 
offers and 56% of acceptances respectively). No differences existed 
between how many defendants were offered and subsequently accepted 
the offer of pretrial diversion for the next largest racial groups: American 
Indians/Alaska Natives (14%), African American (9%), and Asian/Pacific 
Islander (8%). The defendants’ race was either unknown or not indicated 
in 10% of the data. 
The majority of defendants in the pretrial diversion program did not 
have any prior convictions (90% of those offered pretrial diversion and 
91% of those that accepted pretrial diversion, respectively). Defendants 
had a prior conviction in only 9% of offers and 8% of acceptances. This 
supports the program prescripts of defendant eligibility: the Anchorage 
Municipal Pretrial Diversion program has a target population of low-
level first time offenders. The high degree of defendants without a prior 
criminal conviction demonstrates efficacy in the program being 
implemented and applied as it was designed. The data also demonstrate 
the eligibility restrictions’ flexibility because defendants with a criminal 
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conviction made up 9% of those who were offered pretrial diversion and 
8% of those who accepted such offers. This shows that pretrial diversion 
attorneys used discretion in evaluating whether a defendant was still a 
good candidate for pretrial diversion despite a criminal conviction. It is 
plausible that the criminal convictions of those defendants who were 
offered and accepted pretrial diversion were for minor offenses, thus 
qualifying them as good candidates in spite of prior convictions. 
 
Variable Mean/Percentage Anchorage Population 
Estimate 
Age 22.0 32.6 
Gender   
  Male 56.0 50.8 
  Female 44.0 49.2 
Race   
  Caucasian 57.1 66.0 
  African American 8.8 5.6 
  American 
Indian/Alaska Native 14.3 7.9 
  Asian/Pacific Islander 7.7 10.1 
Table 3: Pretrial Defendants Compared to Population Estimates: Age 
used was median. Source: Municipal Pretrial Diversion Evaluation, 
American Community Survey 2010-2014 Estimates. 
 
When the group of defendants that accepted pretrial diversion was 
compared to the population estimates for the Municipality of Anchorage, 
some demographic differences emerged. Those in pretrial diversion had 
a median age of twenty-two, compared to a median age of thirty-seven in 
the general population. The pretrial defendants were more likely to be 
males than females (56% compared to 44%) than the Anchorage 
population (51% compared to 49%). For racial composition of the pretrial 
defendants compared to the Anchorage population, Caucasians were 
underrepresented (57% compared to 66%), as were Asian/Pacific 
Islanders (8% compared to 10%). By contrast, American Indian/Alaska 
Natives were overrepresented in the pretrial diversion group by a factor 
of 45% (14% compared to 8%) and African Americans were 
overrepresented by a factor of 36% (9% compared to 6%). In other words, 
there were fewer Caucasian and Asian/Pacific Islanders in the pretrial 
diversion program as compared to the Anchorage population, and there 
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were more American Indian/Alaska Native and African American 
offenders in the pretrial diversion program than in the Anchorage 
population. 
C. Conditions of Pretrial Diversion 
Conditions of PTD 
 f % 
Fine 81 89.0 
CWS 8 8.8 
N/A (due to defendant 
failing to show to OCA) 2 2.2 
Total 91 100.0 
Table 4: Conditions of Pretrial Diversion 
 
Table 4 outlines the frequency and percentage of the conditions of 
pretrial diversion for those who were offered and accepted the offer of 
pretrial diversion during the data collection period. As stated previously, 
fines comprised nearly 90% of the conditions imposed, with community 
work service assigned to a much smaller percentage of cases, 9%. The 
Municipal Prosecutor reported that all but one of the fines was set at $250, 
and community work service was set at forty hours. The data and 
completion rates demonstrate that most participants in the pretrial 
diversion program preferred a small monetary fine to time spent doing 
community service. 
Descriptive analysis was completed on the pretrial sanctions for 
those defendendants who completed the conditions of pretrial diversion 
during the data collection period. By far the most common completed 
condition was payment of a fine (93%) compared to those who completed 
a condition of community work service (7%). Outside of the discussion of 
the amount of time saved by municipal attorneys and the judiciary via the 
use of pretrial diversion, this demonstrates a successful measure of the 
Anchorage Municipal Pretrial Diversion program in revenue generation. 
If the most common fine amount was $250 and seventy-six defendants 
completed the financial condition of pretrial diversion, a rough estimate 
of $19,000 was generated in a three-month period. Additionally, it can be 
estimated that, during the data collection period, the Anchorage 
Municipal Pretrial Diversion program generated 240 hours of community 
service. 
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D. Length of Time for Pretrial Diversion Processes 
Participants were typically given about a month to complete their 
diversion obligations. The pretrial diversion process was relatively short, 
averaging twenty-four days from pretrial acceptance by the defendant to 
the date of satisfaction of the conditions. Additionally, most defendants 
satisfied their conditions earlier than required with an average of nine 
days before the completion due date. The longest part of the process was 
an average of thirty-one days between the date of offense and screening 
for pretrial diversion. 
Table 5 shows the average amount of time that elapsed for the 
pretrial defendants at each procedural stage in the pretrial diversion 
process. Time spent by both defendants and attorneys for each point in 
the pretrial diversion process illustrates the variation in time estimates. 
 
Time Point in PTD Processes 
  
Date PTD 
Accepted to 
Date PTD 
Completed 
Date of 
Offense to 
Screening 
Date 
Screening 
Date to 
Date PTD 
Offered 
Date PTD 
Offered to 
Date PTD 
Accepted 
N 63 82 82 82 
Mean 24.4762 31.6220 9.0000 6.6829 
Std. 
Deviation 21.11402 57.25698 40.80547 36.25148 
Range 147.00 395.00 388.00 301.00 
Time Point in PTD Processes, Continued 
 
Date PTD 
Accepted to 
Due Date for 
PTD 
Agreement 
Completion 
Due Date 
for PTD 
Agreement 
Completion 
to Outcome 
Date 
Outcome 
Date to 
Date PTD 
Completed 
Date PTD 
Completed 
to Date 
Case 
Closed 
N 81 79 62 62 
Mean 35.5802 9.7700 0.4194 3.2903 
Std. 
Deviation 19.12777 12.16694 3.30200 5.60265 
Range 142.00 41.00 26.00 35.00 
Table 5: Procedural Time Lengths for Pretrial Diversion Processes 
 
As stated above, Table 5 shows the relative swiftness of case 
processing as a measure of success for the Anchorage Municipal Pretrial 
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Diversion program. The mean time (measured in days) spent during the 
different process points of the program are highlighted. As shown, offers 
of and conditions of the pretrial program are closed rather than open-
ended, with an average of twenty-four days spent from the date pretrial 
diversion was accepted until the date that the conditions were satisfied. 
The time between the date of the offense and the time that a municipal 
attorney screens the case for pretrial eligibility was on average thirty-one 
days, and only nine days from the time the case was screened until the 
day that the offer of pretrial diversion was made. On average, defendants 
took six days to accept an offer of pretrial diversion. Once accepted, 
defendants were offered about thirty-five days to complete the conditions 
of pretrial diversion, most often by either paying a fine or completing 
community service. Most notably, many defendants took much less time 
than offered to complete the conditions of pretrial diversion: just nine 
days. While the twenty-four day average from PTD acceptance to PTD 
completion accounts for the days between court hearings, the nine-day 
average in completing conditions of PTD is a more precise measure of the 
number of days, on average, that defendants completed the conditions of 
PTD between hearings. This demonstrates the swiftness or success of 
pretrial diversion in attaining compliance. Once the conditions for pretrial 
diversion were satisfied, it took an average of three days for the municipal 
prosecutor’s office to close the case. Taken as a whole, this mechanism of 
case diversion is a much quicker process for the defendants, prosecution, 
defense attorneys, and the court system than traditional case processing. 
E. Number of Court Hearings and Estimated Time Spent 
The Anchorage Municipal Pretrial Diversion Program appears to be 
very efficient for prosecuting attorneys based on the number of court 
hearings attended and the amount of time devoted to each case. Eighty-
three percent of the cases were closed within two court hearings and 
almost nine out of ten, 89%, of the cases required less than one hour of 
case processing time by the prosecuting attorney. 
Tables 6 and 7 describe the number of court hearings for the eighty-
two defendants that successfully completed the conditions of pretrial 
diversion during the data collection period. Additionally, estimates of 
time spent are detailed for each court hearing, and estimates of total time 
spent for the entire case by the prosecutor is listed. 
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Number of Court Hearings 
 f % 
0 1 1.2 
1 24 29.3 
2 44 53.7 
3 9 11.0 
4 2 2.4 
5 1 1.2 
8 1 1.2 
Total 82 100.0 
Table 6: Number of Court Hearings 
 
Table 6 extends the findings of efficiency in case processing as 
reported in the previous table from the perspective of the municipal 
attorneys handling pretrial diversion cases. The majority of pretrial cases 
(83%) required only one or two court hearings to be processed. 
Additionally, the time of the municipal prosecutors was efficiently used 
with an average of less than one hour (51.3 minutes) spent for each of the 
two court hearings. 
 
Estimated Time Spent on Case  
(In Hours) 
 f % 
0.50 3 3.7 
0.75 58 70.7 
1.00 12 14.6 
1.25 5 6.1 
1.50 2 2.4 
1.75 1 1.2 
2.15 1 1.2 
Total 82 100.0 
Table 7: Estimated Time Spent on Case 
 
Table 7 demonstrates another measurement of time efficiency for 
municipal prosecutors with the use of pretrial diversion. Nearly nine out 
of ten (89%) cases used one hour or less of municipal prosecutors’ time 
for case processing. Without pretrial diversion, it could reasonably be 
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estimated that municipal prosecutors would spend more than one hour 
on each case in traditional adjudicatory processing.61 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The initial assessment of the Anchorage pretrial diversion program 
consisted of a three-month program “snapshot” to determine how often 
the option was utilized and offer data about the cases and the participants. 
During the three-month period, 148 people charged with municipal law 
violations in Anchorage were offered a pretrial diversion alternative 
wherein if they paid a $250 fine or served forty hours of community work 
service within a month their charges would be dismissed. At the close of 
the three-month period, ninety-one of these cases had either been 
dismissed or resulted in convictions. These cases became the sample for 
this assessment. Program effectiveness focused on the following: 
(1) Whether the program is administered as designed (as set forth in 
the Municipal Code); 
(2) Whether participants are successfully completing the program 
requirements and diverted from the system; 
(3) Whether bias or discrimination is present in who has access to the 
program; and 
(4) Whether the program is a cost savings measure for the municipal 
and state governments. 
The Anchorage pretrial diversion program is being operated as 
designed and set forth in the Anchorage Municipal Code.62 Municipal 
prosecutors review cases for program eligibility prior to arraignment. All 
of the cases in the sample were offers extended to those who had 
committed non-violent misdemeanors that were not otherwise barred 
from the program by the Municipal Code.63 Ninety percent of the 
participants had no prior criminal history. These two findings align with 
the program’s stated mission,a diversionary alternative to low level, first 
time misdemeanors. Yet at the same time, some discretionary flexibility is 
intended and is apparent in what we observed. For instance, by design 
not everyone who commits a low-level misdemeanor automatically gets 
an offer to participate. No one is guaranteed participation as the decision 
 
 61.  Id. at 57; Interview with Seneca Theno, Municipal Prosecutor, 
Municipality of Anchorage (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file with authors) [hereinafter 
Theno Interview]. 
 62.  Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060 (2016). 
 63.  Prosecutors may offer diversion in theft cases up to $500 and other 
misdemeanors that do not involve crimes against persons, crimes against minors, 
weapons violations, driving under the influence, gambling, and prostitution. Id. 
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remains within prosecutors’ discretion.64 About 10% of the participants 
were not first time offenders, demonstrating that some discretionary 
decision-making took place in screening decisions. Pretrial obligations 
also matched program design. A fine or community work service was 
required in each case, aligning with the fine and community work service 
schedule set forth in the Anchorage Municipal Code.65 Fines were much 
more common than community work service. Further research should 
explore whether this frequency demonstrates a preference by the 
prosecution or the Municipality to assign a fine instead of community 
work service, or instead whether it reflects the participants’ preferences. 
The program appears appealing, as evidenced by the vast majority 
of people who were offered and accepted participation. Of the ninety-one 
closed cases where an offer was made, eighty-nine defendants accepted 
the offer and eighty-two of those individuals successfully paid their fine 
or completed their community work service within the time limit. On 
average, these participants even completed their obligation nine days 
before their given deadline. 
The initial outcome assessment demonstrated positive results by 
accruing savings, both in money and time, and diverting defendants out 
of the criminal adjudication process. Eighty-three percent of the cases 
were closed within two court hearings and almost nine out of ten (89%) 
of the cases used less than one hour of case processing time by the 
prosecuting attorney. Because offers are accepted at the arraignment 
stage, there is no need to appoint government paid defense counsel, 
which results in further savings. Many of these cases would qualify for a 
public defender if actively prosecuted beyond arraignment. 
Because the number of those who were offered but who 
subsequently failed to complete was so small in our sample, we 
questioned municipal prosecutors for some estimates about comparable 
cases that are actively prosecuted by the office either because the 
defendant was not offered pretrial diversion or because the defendant 
declined the offer.66 By way of example, those charged with driving 
without insurance (DWOI) who wish to challenge their charges get a 
defense attorney appointed. If they are not offered or do not accept 
pretrial diversion at arraignment, then the case is placed in pretrial 
conference status with a pretrial conference hearing every week until 
either trial or a plea is entered at a later change of plea hearing. On 
 
 64.  Frequently Asked Questions—Pretrial Diversion, MUN. OF ANCHORAGE, 
http://www.muni.org/Departments/legal/criminal/Pages/PreTrialDiversion.
aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2017); see also Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060 
(describing the discretionary nature of the program). 
 65.  See Anchorage Mun. Code § 08.05.060. 
 66.  Theno Interview, supra note 61. 
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average there would be three pretrial conference hearings and two change 
of plea hearings for each of these cases because continuances are often 
requested and granted during hearings. For each pretrial conference 
hearing, the prosecution spends anywhere from five to fifteen minutes 
pulling the file and preparing for the hearing and three to four hours 
attending weekly hearings. Each pretrial conference hearing for a 
particular defendant is short, ranging from forty-five seconds to five 
minutes, but because all the pretrial conferences are scheduled together, 
and there is no set order, the time spent in aggregate at the hearing(s) that 
day may be three to four hours. Changing plea hearings are comparable, 
because hearings are lumped together on the court calendar and can take 
one to two hours in total, even though only five to seven minutes is spent 
on any one case. Prosecutors and public defenders attend these docketed 
pretrial conference and change of plea hearings with multiple cases to be 
addressed, but one can quickly extrapolate the mounting time and energy 
spent on any one DWOI case by the prosecution, defense counsel, and the 
court in having to churn these files and address them at such hearings. 
Many more resources are used than when compared to those successfully 
diverted through pretrial diversion. 
Additionally, fines and community work service are generated at the 
front end of the process instead of the back end. According to municipal 
prosecutors, the typical sanction for a DWOI case that is not resolved 
through pretrial diversion is a $500 fine with $250 suspended, thirty days 
jail with all thirty days suspended, two years of probation, and a $50 
surcharge. In other words, the typical penalty is a $250 fine and probation. 
This raises the question: why not just try to collect this at the front end 
before expending extra time and energy? When asked how often these 
defendants sentenced for DWOI actually pay their fine, the response was 
that the Municipality does a “pretty good job” at fine collection because 
they have a very effective collections effort.67 But again, such efforts 
require time, money, and energy. 
Ultimately, the pretrial diversion program saves time for justice 
system agencies involved with minor criminal defendants—time that can 
be more efficiently directed towards involvement and processing of more 
serious criminal defendants. The agencies that directly benefit from 
timesaving include the Municipal Prosecutors Office, the State of Alaska 
Public Defenders Office, and the Anchorage District and Superior Courts. 
Additionally, the defendants benefit from timesaving of diversion 
rather than the process involved with traditional adjudication. Quite 
often, criminal cases impose an arduous time requirement for defendants 
(e.g., court hearings, continuances) that is commonly viewed as more 
 
 67.  Id. 
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burdensome than the adjudication process itself. Defendants often have 
to take time off from work to appear at court, may have to find childcare 
and transportation, and are often unaware of court locations and 
proceedings. This makes the process of court adjudication seem more 
burdensome than a sentencing.68 This may make pretrial diversion more 
attractive to defendants, and may explain why it was so readily accepted 
when offered in Anchorage. 
The program appears to be facially nondiscriminatory. The number 
of males and females who received offers is closely aligned with their 
given proportions in Anchorage. No minority groups appear to be left 
out, although Pacific Islanders were slightly underrepresented. In fact, 
Alaska Natives and African Americans were overrepresented in our 
sample. 
These positive outcomes are particularly important considering that 
this is the first outcome assessment done of the Anchorage Pretrial 
Diversion Program and demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive 
evaluation. Determining the effectiveness of pretrial diversion as a 
resource saving alternative is important due to Alaska’s fiscal constraints. 
Limitations of Research 
This first phase, the initial outcome assessment of the Anchorage 
Pretrial Diversion Program, is not without limitations. Due to the 
sampling methodology, the sample should not be construed as 
representative of all defendants who are offered or accept the offer of 
pretrial diversion. Also, because the sample size is small, caution should 
be used in interpreting the findings. This initial phase aimed to ascertain 
baseline estimates on the number of defendants in the program, their 
characteristics (e.g., types of offenses, demographics, and program 
completion), and program characteristics (e.g., types of conditions, 
completion rates, and duration to completion). The design of the next 
phase of the evaluation can address the limitations of small sample size 
and non-representativeness associated with this phase. The use of 
random sampling in the methodology, with control and comparison 
groups, would lead to a representative and generalizable sample by 
which stronger inferences could be made from the data. A more robust 
methodology would lead to more confidence in any policy implications. 
Additionally, using both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
would increase confidence in the research, lending more credence to any 
policy recommendations. Interviews with defendants centered on their 
 
 68.  See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 154–98 (1992). 
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perceptions of the benefits and challenges of the program would produce 
richer qualitative data about the Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program. 
While this first phase shows promising results in terms of the efficacy of 
the Anchorage Pretrial Diversion Program, stronger research design in 
the subsequent phases will do well to validate these preliminary findings. 
